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COMMITMENT FOLLOWING ACQUITTAL BY REASON OF
INSANITY AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION
OF THE LAWS
To the defendant solicitous of his liberty, all acquittals are not of
equal value; acquittal by reason of insanity does not often result in
liberation. Only in a handful of jurisdictions is the state required to
initiate and pursue the general civil commitment procedure in order to
have a person acquitted by reason of insanity committed to a state
mental institution.' In fifteen states acquittal on grounds of insanity
means compulsory commitment for an indefinite period.' In the re-
mainder, such a defendant's liberty, though not automatically lost, is
severely jeopardized in that commitment may either be ordered at the
discretion of the trial judge or follow a summary inquiry into the
acquitted person's present mental condition.'
1Aiaz. R. Csam. P. 288 (1956); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §28:59 (1951) (misde-
meanors only); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-241(B) (Supp. 1965). Tennessee makes no
special provision for commitment of those acquitted by reason of insanity.2
ARK. STAT. ANN. §59-242 (Supp. 1967) (when judge has "probable cause" to
believe that insanity continues) ; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-4(2) (a) (Supp. 1965) ;
D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d) (1961) ; GA. CODE ANN. §27-1503 (1953); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 62-1532 (Supp. 1967); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit 15, § 103 (1964); MASS.
GEN. LAws ch. 123, § 101 (1965) (murder and manslaughter only); MicH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.966(12) (Supp. 1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.19 (Supp. 1966); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 552.040(1) (Supp. 1967); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 95- 5 08(a) (1968);
Nan. REV. STAT. §29-2203 (1964); Nsv. REv. STAT. § 175.445 (1963); N.Y. CODE
CraM. PRoc. §454(1) (McKinney Supp. 1967); Onio REv. CoDE ANN. § 2945.39
(Page 1954) ; V.I. CODE tit. 5, § 3637 (1967) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-239(1) (Supp.
1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. §957.11(1) (1958).
3 The following statutes provide for commitment at the discretion of the trial
judge: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-37 (Supp. 1965); DEt.. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §4702
(Supp. 1966) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1351 (1964); S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-969 (Supp.
1967).
Mandatory commitment if judge finds that insanity continues: ALA. CODE tit. 15,
8 429 (1959) (if insanity continues "in any degree") ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1704(a)
(Supp. 1966) (or if recurrence is 'highly probable"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-13-3
(Supp. 1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-24-15 (1953). In California commitment is
automatic unless it shall appear to the court that the defendant has "fully recovered."
CAL. PENAL. CoDE § 1026 (West 1956).
Discretionary commitment if the judge finds that insanity continues: HAWAII REv.
LAWS § 258-38-39 (Supp. 1965) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-3-9 (1966).
Mandatory commitment if judge finds release dangerous to the public safety:
ALASKA STAT. § 12.45.090 (1962) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-84 (1964) ; ORE. REv. STAT.
§ 136.730 (1963).
Discretionary commitment if judge finds release dangerous to the public safety:
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 919.11 (1944) (must commit or remand to a friend's care); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 785.19 (1966); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607:3 (Supp. 1967); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12-05-03 (1960) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 26-4-7 (1957) (governor may
commit upon judge's report) ; S.D. CODE § 34.3672 (Supp. 1960) (if judge so "deems");
VT. STAT. ANN. tit 13, § 4806 (1958).
Mandatory commitment if there is a like finding by the trial jury: ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, § 118-2(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967) ; Miss. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2575
(1956) (still insane and dangerous) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:163-3 (1953) (still insane
and dangerous); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1161 (1951) (if dangerous to the public
peace and safety) ; TEx. CODE CalM. PRoc. ANN. art. 46.02, § 2(d) (1) (Supp. 1967) ;
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.76.040 (1961) (still insane or likely to have a recurrence
so as to be dangerous to be at large).
Mandatory commitment if there is a like finding by a second jury: IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 19-2320 (1948) (still insane); Ky. R. CRIM. Paoc. 9.90(2) (1963) (still in-
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Because people are being confined without a very thorough investi-
gation of their present mental condition, it is not surprising that the
constitutionality of these criminal commitment statutes has been often
adjudicated. The most frequent targets of attack have been statutes
which provide for automatic commitment without any sort of hearing
on the continuance of insanity, and the most common contention has
been that such procedures effect a deprivation of liberty without due
process of law.' Almost invariably, these attacks have failed.' Two
recent decisions of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, however, have brought novel thinking to bear on the problem.
In Cameron v. Mullen 0 and Bolton v. Harris 7 it was indicated that
abbreviated procedures for the commitment of those acquitted by reason
of insanity might be unconstitutional as failing to provide equal pro-
tection of the laws.
Due to the diversity of procedures throughout the country, no
easy generality can be propounded as to the impact of equal protection
sane); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 34, § 823 (1956) (still insane). In all three of these
jurisdictions, the trial judge has discretion whether to call the second jury.
In spite of these varying provisions, acquitted defendants are nearly always com-
mitted. See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 728 (1962) ; Note, Releasing Criminal
Defendant's Acquitted and Committed Because of Insanity: the Need for Balanced
Administration, 68 YALEt L.J. 293 (1958).
4 In addition to the due process contention, it has been argued, unsuccessfully, that
compulsory commitment is cruel and unusual punishment. E.g., State v. Toon, 172 La.
631, 135 So. 7 (1931). The cruel and unusual punishment argument would seem to
depend on the same assumption as the due process argument, to wit, the significant
possibility of commitment of persons who are neither presently insane nor (since they
were "acquitted") fit subjects for criminal punishment.
5The first court in the country to address itself to the problem held that com-
pulsory commitment following acquittal by reason of insanity violated due process.
Underwood v. People, 32 Mich. 1 (1875). However, a later case in the same juris-
diction distinguished and severely limited Underwood on the theory that in Underwood
there was no procedure such as habeas corpus available by which to obtain later
release. People v. Dubina, 304 Mich. 363, 8 N.W.2d 99 (1943). To the extent that
there is some sort of release procedure available in every jurisdiction, Underwood is
dead law. The only other case to find a violation of due process in this area was
In re Boyett, 136 N.C. 415, 48 S.E. 789 (1904), which held invalid a discretionary
commitment scheme. There is much in the opinion to suggest that the court was
concerned with the lack of a release provision. To the extent that the decision rested
on this concern, Boyett may be as narrow as Underwood.
Other attacks have generally been rejected. The most common due process argu-
ment centers on the absence of an adequate hearing on present insanity. Since the
acquitted person is exculpated insofar as penal sanctions are concerned, present in-
sanity is the only justification for commitment. In spite of the seeming appeal of this
argument (at least with respect to those jurisdictions which make no inquiry whatso-
ever into present insanity prior to commitment), the courts have been almost uniform
in rejecting such claims. E.g., Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ;
Ex parte Slayback, 209 Cal. 480, 288 P. 769 (1930) ; Bailey v. State, 210 Ga. 52, 77
SE.2d 511 (1953) ; Ex parte Clark, 86 Kan. 539, 121 P. 492 (1912) ; People v. Dubina,
304 Mich. 368, 8 N.W.2d 99, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 766 (1943) ; People ex rel. Pea-
body v. Chanler, 133 App. Div. 159, 117 N.Y.S. 322 (1909); In re Brown, 39 Wash.
160, 81 P. 552 (1905). For a fuller catalogue of cases sustaining these commitment
statutes against constitutional attack, see Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 728
(1962) ; Annot, 145 A.L.R. 892 (1943). For a thoughtful and extremely exhaustive
analysis of the due process clause, see Comment, Compulsory Commitment Following
a Successful Insanity Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REv. 409 (1961).
6 No. 20,308 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 2, 1967).
7No. 21,032 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 16, 1968).
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in this context. These are interrelated systems where a number of
variables are relevant: the type of findings at the criminal trial,' the
post-verdict procedure, if any, for determining present mental condi-
tion,' and the opportunity offered to obtain later release. The District
of Columbia, however, represented a polar situation, juxtaposing a
very liberal civil commitment statute with a minimal finding of past
insanity at the criminal trial,'0 automatic commitment," and harsh
standards for obtaining subsequent release."2 Civil commitment hear-
ings in the District of Columbia are held in the first instance before a
special mental health commission.3 The person sought to be com-
mitted has the right to appeal an adverse decision of the commission to
the district court.'4 Such appeal takes the form of a de novo jury
hearing on the issues of insanity and need for commitment,'5 with the
burden of proof on the person seeking commitment.-" This disparity in
procedures has made the District of Columbia a prime setting for a
constitutional challenge based upon the equal protection clause.
The District of Columbia Cases
In Cameron v. Mullen,7 the defendant, charged with assault, had
been acquitted by reason of insanity at the insistence of the government.
Since the defendant had not raised the defense herself, the mandatory
commitment provision of the District of Columbia Code 18 was not
applicable.'" Nevertheless, the trial court ordered her committed to
Saint Elizabeth's Hospital after holding a hearing on present sanity.
Purported authority for this procedure was found in D.C. Code
section 24-301 (a) ,o the provision for determining competence to stand
8 See note 77 infra.
9 See notes 2 & 3 supra. It might be kept in mind that even in those jurisdictions
where the trial jury makes a special finding on the continuance of insanity, there is
a heavy discrimination against the acquitted person. If the issue of present insanity
is submitted to the jury along with the issues of guilt and past insanity, there are
substantial dangers of prejudice or confusion. See Ramirez v. State, 92 Tex. Crim.
38, 40, 241 S.W. 1020, 1021 (1922) ; State v. Olsen, 360 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Super. Ct.
1962).
16 See text accompanying notes 77-79 infra.
1 See note 21 infra.
'12 See text accompanying notes 88-93 infra.
13 D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-542 (Supp. V, 1966).
14 Id. §545.
is Id.
16Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 711 (1962) (if trier of fact "is satisfied",
etc.).
17 No. 20,308 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 2, 1967).
1
8 D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d) (1961).
19 See note 21 infra.
20 D.C. CoDE AN1. § 24-301(a) (1961) [hereinafter referred to as subsection
(a)], provides:
(a) Whenever any person is arrested, indicted, charged by information,
or is charged in the juvenile court of the District of Columbia, for or with an
offense and, prior to the imposition of sentence or prior to the expiration of
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trial. The D.C. Circuit affirmed the granting of defendant's petition for
habeas corpus, holding that subsection (a) was no more than a device
to determine competence to stand trial and did not empower a court
to act after entry of verdict.' Although the decision rested primarily
on arguments of statutory interpretation, Judge Bazelon continued to
suggest at length that use of subsection (a) to authorize indefinite
post-verdict commitment would raise serious doubts with respect to
equal protection.'
In the subsequent case of Bolton v. Harris,' the mandatory com-
mitment provision, subsection (d), was attacked as failing to provide
equal protection of the laws. Expanding on his dicta in Mullen, Chief
Judge Bazelon held that "persons found not guilty by reason of in-
sanity must be given a judicial hearing substantially similar to those in
any period of probation, it shall appear to the court from the court's own
observations, or from prima facie evidence submitted to the court, that the
accused is of unsound mind or is mentally incompetent so as to be unable to
understand the proceedings against him or properly to assist in his own de-
fense, the court may order the accused committed to the District of Columbia
General Hospital or other mental hospital designated by the court, for such
reasonable period as the court may determine for examination and observation
and for care and treatment if such is necessary by the psychiatric staff of such
hospital. If, after such examination and observation, the superintendent of
the hospital in the case of a mental hospital or the chief psychiatrist of the
District of Columbia General Hospital, shall report that in his opinion the
accused is of unsound mind or mentally incompetent, such report shall be
sufficient to authorize the court to commit by order the accused to a hospital
for the mentally ill, unless the accused or the Government objects, in which
event, the court after a hearing without a jury, shall make a judicial deter-
mination of the competency of the accused to stand trial. If the court shall
find the accused to be then of unsound mind or mentally incompetent to stand
trial, the court shall order the accused confined to a hospital for the mentally
ill.
21 Chief Judge Bazelon argued from the face of the statute (note 20 mtpra) and the
availability of another provision for post-verdict commitment. D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 24-301(d) (1961) provides:
If any person tried upon an indictment or information for an offense, or tried
in the juvenile court of the District of Columbia for an offense, is acquitted
solely on the ground that he was insane at the time of its commission, the
court shall order such person to be confined in a hospital for the mentally ill.
Mielen represents a restriction of a statutory scheme which has not been altogether
successful in the past. D.C. CoDE. ANN. § 24-301(d) attained substantially its present
form soon after the adoption of the Durham rule. Durham v. United States, 214
F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The innovation of this liberal new test of criminal re-
sponsibility stimulated an immediate reaction-much of it negative. See S. REP. No.
1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) ; H.R. REP. No. 892, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955) ;
Hearings on H.R. 6585 Before the Subcommittee on Crime Investigation of the House
Committee on the District of Columbia, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1955). The cul-
mination was the amendment of subsection (d) to require automatic commitment
following acquittal by reason of insanity.
To date, the statute as amended has successfully weathered constitutional chal-
lenge. The principle of mandatory commitment was upheld in Ragsdale v. Overholser,
281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960). It did receive a setback in 1962, however, when the
Supreme Court held that there could be no mandatory commitment under subsection
(d) when a defendant does not affirmatively rely on the defense of insanity. Lynch
v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962). Although the Court granted certiorari to review
possible constitutional problems of due process, the decision rested solely on statutory
construction.
22 Cameron v. Mullen, No. 20,308, at 9-17 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 2, 1967).
23 No. 21,032 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 16, 1968).
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civil commitment proceedings." 24 Instead of holding the entire pro-
vision invalid, however, the court merely read the procedural safe-
guards of the civil commitment statute into subsection (d). The
opinion concluded that automatic commitment is permissible at the
outset for purposes of examination of the acquitted person's present
mental condition. After an adequate period of observation, however,
there must be a judicial determination similar to the civil hearing, with
the burden of proof on the government.2"
In the equal protection analysis of both Mullen and Bolton, heavy
reliance was placed upon the recent Supreme Court decision in Baxtrom
v. Herold.2" In Baxtrom, the Supreme Court held that a New York
statute by which a prisoner nearing the end of his sentence could be
civilly committed without the de novo review by jury available to all
others civilly committed constituted a denial of equal protection. The
Court could find "no conceivable basis for distinguishing the commit-
ment of a person who is nearing the end of a penal term from all other
commitments." 27 Chief Judge Bazelon viewed Baxtrom as directly in
point. In Mullen he asserted that:
Baxtrom thus might be said to require the conclusion that
while prior criminal conduct is relevant to the determination
whether a person is mentally ill and dangerous, it cannot
justify the denial of procedural safeguards for that deter-
mination.2
He noted the similarities in the statutory contexts-
In the District of Columbia, the differences between commit-
ment under Subsection (a) and civil commitment . . . are
more pronounced than the differences struck down by the
Supreme Court in Baxtrom. ....
-as well as the common traits of Baxtrom and Mrs. Mullen-
[B] oth had been involved in prior criminal activity, both were
summarily committed because of it, and both could seek
release by habeas corpus. . .. 0
-in raising doubts as to the equal protection afforded by indefinite
commitment via the summary procedure of subsection (a). In Bolton,
241d. at 14-15.
25 Id.
26 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
27 Id. at 111-12.
2 8 Cameron v. Mullen, No. 20,30, at 13 (D.C. Cir., Mar. 2, 1967).
29 Id. at 10-11.
30 Id. at 12.
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Chief Judge Bazelon adopted the same positions in finding similar con-
stitutional infirmities in mandatory commitment under subsection (d)."
It would seem, however, that such a comparison of the fact
situations in Baxtrom, Mullen, and Bolton is somewhat undiscriminat-
ing. It is true that each petitioner had been involved in "prior criminal
activity," but in Baxtrom there had been no previous acquittal by
reason of insanity. The connection between mental disorder and the
administration of criminal justice was, in that case, fortuitous.
3 2  In
Bolton and Mullen, however, the defendants' mental condition had been
argued previously before the trier of fact at the criminal trial and
found to have been connected with their dangerous behavior. In
Baxtrom the Supreme Court announced that it was striking down a
statute which had no semblance of rationality.3 3 But mandatory or
summary commitment is "rational" at least to the extent that it will
protect society from those who have committed criminal acts, but have
not been incarcerated because of their mental condition. At any rate,
it seems clear that a violation of equal protection cannot be found
merely by observing that both Bolton and Baxtrom had been involved
in prior criminal activity and procedurally discriminated against in
consequence. The inquiry must of necessity focus more specifically
upon the particular factual and legal implications of acquittal by reason
of insanity, some of which were employed but not fully expounded
in Bolton.
The Requirements of Equal Protection
The equal protection problem here is not merely whether or not
there is inequality of treatment; the procedural discrimination is
patent. What is involved is the doctrine of reasonable classification.
34
31 In Bolton, Chief Judge Bazelon also relied on Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605
(1967), and People v. Lally, 19 N.Y.2d 27, 277 N.Y.S.2d 654, 224 N.E.2d 87 (1966).
In Lally the New York Court of Appeals emphatically denied the relevance of Baxtrom
to provisions for commitment of those acquitted by reason of insanity. Notwithstand-
ing these assertions, however, the New York court went on to hold that the pro-
cedural safeguards of civil commitments should be imputed to New York's mandatory
commitment statute.
In Specht, the Supreme Court held that due process was offended by a failure to
grant a full hearing on mental condition prior to the imposition of an indefinite sen-
tence for specialized treatment under a sex-offender statute.
Although neither case is squarely on point in terms of strict logic, each neverthe-
less evinces a strong judicial concern for the requirement of a hearing before com-
mitment on the ground of mental abnormality.
3 2 In Baxtrom the Court said:
Classification of mentally ill persons as either insane or dangerously insane
may be reasonable for purposes of determining the type of custodial or medical
care to be given, but it has no relevance whatever in the context of the
opportunity to show whether a person is mentally ill at all.
Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966).
33 .... all semblance of rationality ... disappears." Id. at 115.
34 A threshold question is whether the state is constitutionally compelled to afford
an insanity defense at all. If not, perhaps it would be argued that the state is free
to attach conditions to acquittal by reason of insanity. The question has rarely been
faced, since some form of insanity defense has been recognized without exception in
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Equal protection demands that the legislative classification be reason-
able in light of the purpose of the law. 5 Professors Tussman and
tenBroeck, in their classic article on the theoretical bases of equal pro-
tection, 6 defined the problem of reasonable classification in terms of
a factual comparison of two classes: the class of persons defined by the
mischief which the legislation is intended to abate, and the class of
persons defined by the legislation itself.37  Here, such a comparison
involves respectively the class of the dangerously insane and the class
of those acquitted by reason of insanity.
Traditionally, the constitutional requirement of equal protection
has been interpreted so as to evince the greatest possible respect for
legislative judgment. The Supreme Court has articulated this policy
in a variety of ways: equal protection leaves to the states "a wide
scope of discretion"; 1 a legislative classification is acceptable if not
based on grounds "wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's
objective" " and if not "purely arbitrary"; legislation will be sus-
tained "if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it." 41
Literally applied, such formulae might lead readily to the conclusion
that mandatory or summary commitment following acquittal by reason
of insanity is a valid classification.
It has long been recognized, however, that not every legislative
classification warrants such deference. The decisions which have held
the Western world for several centuries. On the two occasions when legislatures had
attempted to abolish the defense, courts were quick to find a violation of due process.
Sinclair v. State. 161 Miss. 142, 132 So. 581 (1931) ; State v. Strasburg, 60 Wash.
106, 110 P. 1020 (1910). It is said that the defense of insanity must be allowed be-
cause "the minimum requirements of mens rea . . . compel it" State v. White, 60
Wash. 2d 551, 590, 374 P.2d 942, 965 (1962) (dictum) ; cf. Morisette v. United States,
342 U.S. 246 (1952); Shelvin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57 (1910).
Even if it is assumed that a state may constitutionally abolish the insanity defense,
there remains an equal protection issue. Once a state has made the judgment that an
insane person (however the state defines insanity) is not criminally responsible, e.g.,
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1161 (1951), its only perceivable interest in commitment
is present insanity-the same interest protected by its civil conunitment procedures.
Cf. Huebner v. State, 33 Wisc.2d 505, 147 N.W.2d 646 (1967). Heubner invalidated
an x parte procedure for determining whether convicted sex criminals should be sent
to prison or receive specialized treatment Although the court did not rest its decision
on equal protection grounds, it cited Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), in sup-
port of the proposition that
conviction of a sex crime as a basis for the denial of a hearing on the issue
of mental aberrations and the need for specialized treatment does not seem to
be a relevant distinction. ... The commission of sex crimes may be sufficient
grounds to require an examination, but it is not sufficient to deny the right in
court to contest the agency's findings and recommendations.
Id. at 528, 147 N.W.2d at 657. Contra, State v. English, 198 Kan. 196, 424 P.2d 601
(1967)
35 E.g., Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490, 493 (1927) (classification
must have "a reasonable relationship to the subject of the particular legislation").36 Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv.
341 (1949).
371d. at 344-53.
as McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
39 Id.
40 Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
41 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
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equal protection to require so little have, for the most part, involved
taxation or regulation of business activity.' In other contexts more
has been required to sustain a discrimination.43 This has been most
obvious when the legislative classification has in any way involved a
racial discrimination. Speaking for the Court in Korenatsu v. United
States,44 Mr. Justice Black stated: "It should be noted, to begin with,
that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial
group are immediately suspect . .. [T]he courts must subject them
to the most rigid scrutiny." 4 And most recently, in Loving v.
Virginia,46 the Court emphasized "[t]he very heavy burden of justi-
fication which the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally required
of state statutes drawn according to race." "
What does it mean to state that some legislative classifications
affecting fundamental liberties are "suspect" and to be viewed with
"rigid scrutiny"? Literally, these phrases denote no more than careful
and attentive review of the classifications. But these expressions must
imply more, to wit, that in certain areas equal protection demands a
more exacting standard, that a classification will have to be "reasonable"
(or even more) rather than merely founded on some rational basis.48
When the stakes are high, and the classification sweeps within its
ambit "innocent" persons, the courts will move more toward a
balancing approach which will require that the classification be "closely
tailored." "
It might be argued that the racial discrimination cases are a class
unto themselves, that prohibition of racial discrimination was the one
substantive value embodied in the fourteenth amendment, and that,
consequently, lack of judicial deference in this particular area reveals
42 See Sholley, Equal Protection in Tax Legislation, 24 VA. L. REv. 229, 388
(1938).
431 think state regulation should be viewed quite differently where it touches
or involves freedom of speech, press, religion, petition, assembly, or the other
specific safeguards of the Bill of Rights.
Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 471 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting). See also, Tuss-
man & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALin L. REv. 341, 373
(1949).
44 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
45Id. at 216.
46388 U.S. 1 (1967).
471d. at 9.
48 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) provides a good example of a balancing
approach. The classification involved there was certainly "rational." The Court
balanced the value of the right to vote against a supposedly "remote administrative
benefit to the state," and came down in favor of protecting the former. See text ac-
companying notes 53-56 infra.
49A recent lower federal court decision summarized the evolving standard of equal
protection in this way:
That is, the objectives (the laws) further must be unattainable by narrower
or less offensive legislative courses; and even if so, those objectives must be
of sufficient magnitude to override, in the court's judgment, the evil of the
inequality which the legislation engenders.
Hobson v. Hannah, 269 F.Supp. 401, 507 (D.D.C. 1967).
1968]
932 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
little about the standard of equal protection in nonracial contexts. 5°
Nevertheless, the notion that "any rational basis" may not satisfy equal
protection has found expression in other areas.
Several recent voting rights cases also have evinced close judicial
scrutiny. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,"- which held in-
valid a Virginia poll tax, the Supreme Court noted:
We have long been mindful that where fundamental rights
and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause,
classifications which might invade or restrain them must be
closely scrutinized and carefully confined.
2
In Carrington v. Rash,53 a provision of the Texas constitution which
withheld the franchise from servicemen who had been in the military
when they first entered the state was held to violate the equal protection
clause. The Court conceded that the state had a substantial interest
in insulating its elections from transients, and that a large majority of
the group from which the right to vote was withheld very likely had
no intention of establishing a permanent domicile. Nevertheless, the
Court maintained that the provision in question dealt with "matters
close to the core of our constitutional system," "' and that the franchise
was a right that "this court has been so zealous to protect." 5 Thus,
the Court held that "States may not casually deprive a class of indi-
viduals of the vote because of some remote administrative benefit to
the State." 56 A third voting rights case displayed a similar attitude.
In Katzenbach v. Morgan,57 the issue was the constitutionality of a
section of the Federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 which precluded
New York from applying its English-language literacy requirement for
voting to Puerto Rican immigrants who had completed the sixth grade
in Puerto Rican schools. In reference to its discussion of the state
law, the Court noted that although equal protection usually allows wide
latitude to legislative judgment, "states can be required to tailor care-
r0 See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 682 n.3 (1966) (Har-
lan, J., dissenting) :
I think the somewhat different application of the Equal Protection Clause to
racial discrimination cases finds justification in the fact that insofar as that
clause may embody a particular value in addition to rationality, the historical
origins of the Civil War Amendments might attribute to racial equality this
special status.
51383 U.S. 663 (1966).
62 Id. at 670.
53380 U.S. 89 (1965). But cf. Dreuding v. Devlin, 380 U.S. 125, aff'g per
curi am, 234 F. Supp. 721 (D. Md. 1965) (one-year residence requirement for voting
no denial of equal protection).
54 380 U.S. at 96 (1965).
15 Id.
156 Id.
57 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
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fully the means of satisfying a legitimate state interest when funda-
mental rights and liberties are threatened. . . ." "
A somehow "stricter" standard of equal protection also seems to
be applied to legislative classifications based on past criminal conduct.
In Skinner v. Oklahoma,3 9 for example, the Court struck down a
statute prescribing sterilization for certain classes of habitual criminals.
The Court did, however, stress that the opportunity to procreate was
"one of the basic civil rights of man. . . . in emphasis of our view
that strict scrutiny of the classification . . . is essential . . . . "
The foregoing cases illustrate that judicial attitudes toward the
equal protection clause have varied in intensity. Although a stricter
standard has been articulated primarily in cases involving classifications
drawn according to race and those limiting the right to vote, the Court
has stated that such a standard will be applied whenever "fundamental
liberties and rights" 1 are imperiled. Accepting these assertions at
face value, there is little reason to doubt that such close scrutiny would
be applied to procedures for commitments following acquittal by reason
of insanity, since such procedures directly affect personal liberty.
Surely freedom is as "fundamental" as the right to vote, and is scarcely
less close to "the core of our constitutional system." 62
Other considerations suggest a strict judicial attitude toward
criminal commitment procedures. The legislative classification here
involved is over-inclusive. When addressing itself to under-inclusive
classifications, i.e., classifications which single out only part of a
seemingly similar group for regulation or sanction, the Court has
justified the legislature's action with the argument that "a statute
aimed at what is deemed an evil, and hitting it presumably where ex-
perience shows it to be most felt, is not to be upset .... 3 In the
over-inclusive situation, this rationale is inapplicable. In the under-
inclusive case those at whom the law is directed are, by definition,
tainted with the evil which the law seeks to combat, and consequently
engender little sympathy. In the over-inclusive case, however, the
net is cast so wide that wholly innocent persons are swept within. In
this latter situation there is a greater need for judicial overview and
intervention."
Finally, the present legislative classification of persons acquitted
by reason of insanity involves a procedural discrimination. The defini-
tion of equal protection in terms of great deference to the legislative
r)8Id. at 655 n.15 (emphasis added).
59 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
60 Id. at 541.
% Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
6
2 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
63 Consolidated Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U.S. 224, 227 (1914).
6 4 Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. RE;v,
341, 348-53 (1949).
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judgment was no doubt born in large part of the same considerations
which led to the atrophy of substantive due process-judicial realization
of both the impracticability and impropriety of second-guessing the
legislature's choice between two social theories.' But when the equal
protection issue does not involve a substantive choice, intense judicial
review is at least feasible. In assessing a procedural discrimination,
the court is in a somewhat better position to judge whether the legis-
lative means is well adapted to the end. Since the court's own
processes are involved, one could expect the court to utilize its own
expertise. Even though there may be no singularly superior judicial
competence in the area of mental illness, a reviewing court would not
have to operate in a vacuum. The civil commitment procedures, which
presumably represent the legislature's judgment on how best to arrive
at "truth" with respect to the issues of sanity and need for commitment,
constitute a readily available yardstick for comparison.3o
Equal Protection Applied
If equal protection requires the legislative classification to be
"closely tailored" when "fundamental liberties and rights" are in-
volved, an arguable corollary is that the legislature will be permitted
to paint with an overbroad brush when necessary to protect equally
"fundamental" state interests.67 In the context of treatment of those
acquitted by reason of insanity, the state has a concededly significant
interest in preventing the release of dangerous persons. A worthwhile
starting point for an examination of this interest is an analysis of the
rationales of those cases which have sustained similar commitment
statutes against claims of lack of procedural due process. From them
emerge several possible justifications for the employment of abbreviated
commitment procedures.
In arriving at his conclusion in Bolton, Judge Bazelon stressed
the fact that the findings at the criminal trial concerned only past
insanity. 5 In doing so, he largely ignored the most common argument
traditionally offered in defense of mandatory commitment, an argu-
6 5 For the famous harbinger, see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
66 Generally, the most striking aspect of civil commitment procedures is the use
made of medical expertise. Some jurisdictions, for example, provide for hearing on
the issue of mental condition before a special mental health commission. CoLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 71-1-6 to -11 (1963) ; GA. CoDE ANN. § 88-506 (Supp. 1967) ; ILL.
REv. STAT. §§ 9-1 to -13 (Supp. 1967); IOWA CODE §§ 229.1 to .17 (1966) ; NEB. Riiv.
STAT. §83-328.03 (1966); VA. CODE ANN. §37-62 (Supp. 1966); W. VA. CODE
§ 27-5-4 (1966). It is hard to see how these states can justify foregoing the benefit of
expert medical knowledge when dealing with those acquitted by reason of insanity.
67 The Supreme Court has asserted that it will not be receptive to over-inclusive
classifications when the over-inclusiveness only results in "some remote administrative
benefit to the State." Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965). The implication
is that when a balancing test is applied under the equal protection clause, societal as
well as individual interests will be weighed.
68 Bolton v. Harris, No. 21,032, at 5 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 16, 1968).
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ment centering on the assumption that past insanity is a strong indica-
tion of present insanity. In light of this presumption of continuing
insanity, it is argued that jury consideration of the issue of insanity at
the time of the crime serves as an adequate substitute for post-trial
inquiry into present sanity."' To the extent that this presumption is
true in fact, the two classes will be closer to coextension-the ideal
legislative classification.7" It is of course impossible to predict with
any sort of precision the number of cases in which insanity will persist
between any two given points in time. It would seem, however, almost
a matter of common knowledge that insanity is for the most part a
long-lasting phenomenon. Although the discipline of psychology is of
relatively recent origin and has not achieved nearly the degree of
certitude attained by other sciences, we have long since discarded the
notion that lunacy is the manifestation of a sudden visitation by
evil demons.
There are, however, substantial difficulties with any presumption
of continuing insanity, even if one tentatively accepts such a presumption
as valid. Mental disorder is not a homogeneous phenomenon; the
validity of the presumption will vary considerably from case to case.
Furthermore, the relevant factor is dangerousness of the individual to
self or society. If the criminal act was a reaction to a particular stress
situation unlikely to recur, there is little reason to expect the individual
to be a continuing danger to himself or others; 71 in some situations,
in fact, the act itself may have effected a "cure" of the problem,' and
similar situations may be faced in the future without likelihood of
further reaction. On the other hand, many types of personality dis-
orders may be difficult or impossible to cure; such defendants are
clearly not ready for release should they be acquitted of crime by reason
of insanity.73 The point is not that the presumption is necessarily in-
valid, but rather that the variation from case to case is so large as to
make a general presumption of little worth.y
69 It is asserted that since the criminal trial contained the whole panoply of pro-
cedural safeguards, the person committed has been afforded due process of law. See,
e.g., In re Brown, 39 Wash. 160, 81 P. 552 (1905) ; Ex parte Clark, 86 Kan. 539, 121
P. 492 (1912). One statute specifically recites the presumption. Onio REv. CoDE
ANN. § 2945.39 (1954).
70 Strictly speaking, even if the presumption of continuing insanity were infallible,
the classification would still be imperfect. There undoubtedly exist dangerously insane
persons who neither have been nor will be acquitted of a crime by reason of insanity.
This under-inclusiveness, however, would be irrelevant to an equal protection argument.
See notes 63-64 spra and accompanying text
71 See, e.g., Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 182 (1879) ; Norris, Somnandbiistic
Homicide: Ghosts, Spiders, and North Koreans, 5 Rns JuDiCATAF 29 (1951).
72 See Menninger & Mayman, Psychological Aspects of the Organism Under
Stress, 2 J. Ams. PSYcnOANALYTICAL Ass'N 67, 280 (1954).
73 E.g., Wright v. United States, 250 F.2d 4 (D.S. Cir. 1957) (en banc). For an
extended and tragic history of a psychopathic personality, see J. KATZ, J. Gox.Zs=En &
A. DERsxowrrz, PsycnoANALysIS, PSYcHiATRY AND LAW 526-35 (1967). For an idea
of the scope of the problem, see id. at 601-14.
74 Any attempt at close analysis of those acquitted by reason of insanity is likely
to founder for lack of sufficient data. Even in the District of Columbia, with one of
1968]
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The length of time over which insanity is to be presumed to
continue must also be considered. There is often a significant delay
between commission of the alleged offense and arrest, especially with
capital crimes where there is no statute of limitations. The limited
efficiency of our judicial institutions frequently results in crowded court
dockets and consequent deviation from ideals of speedy justice.75 Even
if the presumption of continuing insanity is deemed credible when
applied to a short period of time, it would seem tenuous when a period
of years is involved.
76
Finally, the presumption of continuing insanity necessarily assumes
an affirmative finding of past insanity. Such a finding is by no means
implicit in a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. In the District
of Columbia, for example, although the prosecution may rest initially
upon a presumption of sanity, once evidence of mental disorder is
introduced the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
either that defendant was sane at the time of the alleged offense or that
the offense was not the "product" of such insanity.77  Thus, implicit in
an acquittal solely on grounds of insanity is at most 7' a reasonable
the most liberal standards in the nation, there were only some 90 acquittals by reason
of insanity in the district and municipal courts in the five years following Durham
v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). Clayton, Durham Rile Weighed
After 5 Years in Use, Washington Post, August 9, 1959, at El, col. 1.
75 See cases collected at 1961 DUKE L.J. 481, 483 n.18 (1961).
'6 That the "presumption of continuing insanity" can be woefully inadequate under
certain circumstances is dramatically demonstrated by Hodison v. Rogers, 137 Kan.
950, 22 P.2d 491 (1933). Defendant was alleged to have passed bad checks on August
20, 1932. On August 24, after appropriate probate court proceedings, he was civilly com-
mitted as feeble-minded. On February 10, 1933 defendant was found to be of "sane
mind" and released. Less than three months after this release he was indicted for the
above-mentioned crime and thereafter acquitted by reason of insanity. On April 22,
1933, he was committed. It was held that the intervening certification of sanity did
not in any way alter the court's duty to commit.
A related type of case is that in which there has been a pretrial examination to
determine competence to stand trial, and the examiners report back that the defendant
is presently sane. Admittedly, this is not as strong an indictment of the presumption
of continuing insanity rationale as is Hodison, supra, since the test of competence is in
theory limited to the sole issue of whether the defendant can comprehend the proceed-
ings against him and intelligently aid in his own defense. However, the psychiatrists
who conduct these examinations often miscontrue their limited mandate and report back
general information about mental condition. Comment, 59 MIcE. L. Rxv. 1078 (1961).
To the extent that the examiners report mental fitness in general terms, the presump-
tion argument is vitiated. See In re Oslatter, 103 Kan. 487, 175 P. 377 (1918) ; State
v. Burris, 169 La. 520, 125 So. 580 (1929).77 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). In almost one-half
of the states there is no affirmative finding of insanity at the criminal trial; in most of
these the burden is likewise on the state to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.03, app. C, at 193 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955); Comment,
Compulsory Commitment Following a Successful Insanity Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. REV.
409, 425 n.47 (1961).
78 The web tends to tangle here, and further explication may be warranted. Ini-
tially, defendant's past sanity is presumed. All he need do, however, is produce evi-
dence indicating insanity at the time of the offense. At this point the state has the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt either that defendant was sane at the time
of the offense or that the offense was not a product of his past insanity. Acquittal by
reason of insanity therefore implies that the state has failed in both; it does not indi-
cate by what margin it has failed in either. Even if the government stipulated past
insanity and argued only the "product" issue, the defendant can hardly be bound by
his antagonist's stipulation; and his raising the issue amounts not to a claim of past
insanity but to a claim of a reasonable doubt of past sanity, a very different thing.
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doubt with respect to past sanity.79 Even if accepted, then, a presump-
tion of continuing insanity would indicate no more than a reasonable
doubt as to present sanity.80
A second possible justification is the recognition of a supposed
legislative policy to utilize commitment as a threat to discourage false
insanity pleas."' One cannot gainsay the deterrent value of summary
or mandatory commitment, but the basic propriety of the approach can
be questioned. In the first place, the mere existence of such a policy
in no way mitigates the problem of the possible commitment of those
who are neither culpable for their past behavior nor presently insane.
Second, even if the spectre of commitment does have some tendency to
discourage bogus claims of insanity, it will no doubt have a similar
dampening effect on potentially meritorious ones. Because of this
dampening effect on meritorious claims, the deterrent rationale, on
balance, seems to merit little weight.
3
A third argument-that mandatory commitment is defensible as
a necessary discovery device-was adopted by the D.C. Circuit in
Ragsdale v. Overholser."4 In holding that mandatory commitment
pursuant to subsection (d) 85 did not violate the due process clause,
the court argued that
[i]t is hardly asking too much to require that a defendant who
is absolved from punishment by society because of his mental
condition at the time of the criminal act should accept some
restraint on his liberty by confinement in a hospital for such
period as is required to determine whether he will be dan-
gerous if released. This is implicit in the idea expressed in
Overholser v. Leach that such a defendant is part of an
"exceptional class." 86
Whereas the older cases often looked backward to the criminal trial as
an adequate hearing on present insanity, 7 Ragsdale implicitly looks
forward to some future habeas corpus proceeding as the proper forum
70 Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F._d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Fahy, J., con-
curring).
80 See Krash, The Durham Ride and Judicial Administration of the Insanity
Defense in the District of Colombia, 70 YAM L.J. 905, 934 (1961).8 1 See Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 715 (1962).
82.An attorney in the District of Columbia intimately involved in the insanity
defense has stated that it is wise for the lawyer there to attempt to dissuade his clients
from reliance on an insanity defense save in cases where the client has been charged
with a most serious crime. Krash, supra note 80, at 947-48.
83 The deterrence rationale is further discredited to the extent that an alternative
means of coping with bogus insanity pleas is available. Cf. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 4803 (1958), which provides for temporary commitment and examination in advance
of trial whenever insanity is pleaded so "that the truth or falsity of such plea may be
ascertained." If a balancing approach is taken, a court might require the state to
choose the less onerous of two adequate procedures.
84 281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
85 D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d) (1961).
36 281 F.2d at 949.
87 See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
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for adjudicating the issue of the need for indefinite commitment, with
the initial mandatory commitment being no more than a necessary op-
portunity for the prosecution to prepare its case.
The discovery analogy is appealing on its face; mandatory com-
mitment for these limited purposes would seem a reasonable compromise
between the interests of the state and those of the individual. Accept-
ing this rationale would mean that the legislative classification would be
virtually perfect. The law, under such a view, would be designed to
provide for examination of those who might be dangerously insane,
and the present sanity of all those acquitted by reason of insanity is,
at the very least, suspect.
There are, however, serious shortcomings to this rationale. The
District of Columbia statute envisions administrative determination of
restoration of sanity as the primary mode of release; " the only
alternative to the hospital superintendent's recommendation for release
is habeas corpus. The standard for release through habeas corpus
borders on the impossible: " one seeking release must show that he is
sane, that he will not be dangerous to himself or others in the fore-
seeable future,9" and that the superintendent acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in refusing to recommend release."- All this must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and all doubts as to present mental
status are to be resolved against petitioner.92 Furthermore, there is
no provision for final adjudication after a predetermined period of
observation. The length of commitment is viewed in terms of a re-
covery period and not in terms of a period for examination. In light of
the foregoing, it is not surprising to find a long average period of
confinement after a successful insanity defense. 3  In these circum-
stances a court might be wary of accepting the characterization of these
commitments as constituting no more than a discovery device.
If it is accepted that initial commitment is no more than an
observation period, some disposition must be made of defendants when
the period is over. The relevant comparison is therefore between
88 D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(e) (1961).
89 Krash, The Durham Rule and Judicial Administration of the Insanity Defense
in the District of Columbia, 70 YALE L.J. 905, 943 (1961); see D.C. CODE ANN.
§24-301(g) (1961).
90 D.C. CODE ANN. §24-301(e) (1961). "Dangerousness" has been judicially
interpreted to include the possibility of the future commission of such crimes as the
passing of bad checks. Overholser v. Russell, 283 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1960). This
expansive construction of the statutory criterion further accentuates the difficulties of
obtaining release.
91 Overholser v. Russell, 283 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Overholser v. Leach,
257 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959).
92 Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (dictum); see
Overholser v. Leach, 257 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013
(1959).
es Halleck, The Insanity Defense in the District of Columbia-A Legal Lorelei,
49 GEO. L.J. 294, 314-15 (1960). Even in Ragsdale it was conceded that initial com-
mitment could last "for ten years--or even beyond that" It is hard to see how
Ragsdale could make this admission, and still cling to its discovery analogy.
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habeas corpus and civil commitment. In the former there is no right
to a jury and the burden of proof is entirely upon the person seeking
release. If the government has had the opportunity to examine the
individual at length prior to his habeas corpus petition, it presumably
can maintain a convincing case against any person who is truly insane,
and there would appear to be no compelling reason to deny such
a person a liberal opportunity to demonstrate that he is not insane-
an opportunity comparable to that afforded in civil commitment
proceedings.
Finally, even if initial commitment were viewed as a discovery
device, the necessity of such discovery can be questioned. In many
cases involving an insanity defense there is also the issue of competence
to stand trial which entails commitment for observation and examina-
tion by state psychiatrists. In some jurisdictions, a pretrial examina-
tion is required whenever the plea of insanity is interposed. 4  Such
examination, although conducted to decide the limited issue of com-
petence to stand trial, will also reveal information on the larger issue
of present insanity, and one can perceive no reason why such in-
formation could not be offered in a civil commitment proceeding im-
mediately following acquittal. In addition, many civil commitment
statutes themselves provide for temporary confinement for examination
prior to a full hearing on the issue of sanity." To the extent that these
civil procedures provide for necessary periods of observation, criminal
commitment statutes surely cannot be defended against equal pro-
tection attack by resort to a discovery analogy.
CONCLUSION
Criminal commitment procedures offering considerably fewer safe-
guards than corresponding civil commitment procedures do not afford
equal protection of the laws. In view of the present emphasis
(epitomized in the Supreme Court's decisions in Baztrom v. Herold 9'
and Specht v. Patterson 1 7) on adequate determinations of insanity, the
reasonableness of any disparity between the two types of procedures
must be subject to close scrutiny. The state's only justification for
committing those acquitted by reason of insanity is present insanity
and dangerousness, the same interest embodied in civil commitment
procedures."" None of the three rationales examined justifies a vast
difference.
o4 E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4803 (1958).
95 D.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 21-521 to -528 (Supp. V, 1966) ; ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
91Y2, § 9-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 34, § 2333 (Supp. 1967);
MASS. Gn.N. LAWs ch. 123, §§ 78-79 (1965); MicH. Come. LAws § 14.811 (Supp.
1968) ; OHao REv. CoDE § 5122 (Supp. 1966) ; WASH. REv. CoDE § 71.02.120 (1962).
96383 U.S. 107 (1966).
97 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
9sA finding of mental illness is not enough to justify commitment in the District
of Columbia. It must also be found to the satisfaction of the trier of fact that the
940 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
This conclusion, however, does not mean that the state must
necessarily afford acquitted defendants procedures identical with those
afforded civil defendants. In order to protect society, some divergence
is justified. To the extent that those acquitted by reason of insanity
have more clearly than others demonstrated the likelihood of present
dangerousness, different treatment is warranted. Even assuming that
both classes deserve an equal degree of protection, there remains the
possibility that the state may vary the precise procedural formats to
foster administrative convenience so long as the end result is substantial
equivalence.
In Bolton v. Harris,99 therefore, the court was correct in finding
that the District of Columbia commitment procedure amounted to a
denial of equal protection. The critical omission in the criminal
commitment procedure was the lack of a hearing on the issue of present
insanity. This fault was not (as was suggested in Overholser v.
Leach 100) cured by the possibility of release by habeas corpus, since
the standards for such release are virtually impossible to meet.'' The
judicial imputation of a requirement of a hearing into subsection (d)
seems to conflict both with the face of the statute and with its legis-
lative history,"0 2 but the court seems to have assumed that such an
imputation was the only way to avoid completely overturning the
statute. Perhaps it would have been sufficient to have liberalized the
procedural attributes of habeas corpus to a point consistent with the
Ragsdale ..3 view of mandatory commitment as a discovery device.
As the equal protection clause is used to attack other mandatory
and summary commitment procedures, courts will be faced with ever
more delicate questions of substantial equivalence. Some hearing on
present insanity appears to be a sine qua non. Confinement between
acquittal and an insanity hearing seems unobjectionable in view of the
defendant's past criminal behavior. At the hearing itself, certain de-
partures from the civil procedures may be acceptable. A strong state
interest in deterring false pleas or a considered affirmation of the
validity of the presumption of continuing insanity might conceivably
justify placing the burden of proof on the person seeking to avoid
commitment. In jurisdictions which provide that the defense of in-
person sought to be committed "is likely to injure himself or other persons if allowed
to remain at liberty . . ." D.C. CODE A_ . § 21-544 (Supp. V. 1966). This express
statutory criterion of dangerousness tends to belie any argument that the state is
interested in more dangerous species of insanity in the context of criminal commitment.
99 No. 21,032 (D.C. Cir., Feb. 16, 1968).
100 257 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1013 (1959).
10 1 See text accompanying notes 88-93 supra.
10 2 See note 21 supra.
103 Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1960). See text accompanying
notes 84-87 supra.
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sanity must be affirmatively proved at the criminal trial,10 4 the need for
a jury at the post-trial hearing might be obviated.
As courts begin to address themselves to the equal protection issue
in this context, there will no doubt be a diversity of opinion with respect
to the weight to be assigned the several factors determining the solution
in any given jurisdiction. It is to be hoped, however, that a substantial
consensus will develop consistent with the substantial equivalence test
adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit.
1 04 See note 77 supra.
